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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Fraud on the Court
rJn

October 21, 1983, attorney John

s.

Davis was convicted for

,nLezzling approximately $100,000.00 from his trust account, which money
lie was holding for the partnership comprised of Defendant-Respondent,
Charley Joseph, and Plaintiff-Appellant, Joseph Mascaro.

It was this act

of embezzlement by the partnershii:i's attorney, along with attorney
unscrupulous manipulation, deceit and self dealing, which precipitated this
lawsuit.

Following

attorney

Davis'

theft of the partnershi_e's cash,

attorney Davis embarked on a scheme to manipulate our judicial system
through his superior skill, knowledge and training, and by the high position
of trust he held as an officer of the court. The scheme to defraud the
court, while not particularly sophisticated, was remarkably successful.
For nearly a year and a half, he was able to fraudulently manipulate the
court system to cover up his own felonious activities and deliberately
prevent his own client, Defendant-Respondent, Joseph, from presenting
meritorious defenses and counterclaims.

Attorney

actions, as an

officer of the Court, constituted a deliberate fraud on the Court of the
most egregious sort, was a tampering with the administration of justice,
and is a wrong against the very institutions set up to protect and preserve
society itself.
It is vitally important to the proper understanding of this case, and
its convoluted procedural history in the lower court, to constantly keep in
rn111d that Mr. Davis, from the day that Plaintif;'s summons was served,
%ea this lawsuit to attempt to keep his theft hidden.
111J.rrors, nothing is as it appears.

Like a house of

What seems to be the simple failure to
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respond to a

summons

was in fact the first step in ,, deliberate arid

intentional scheme to manipulate the judicial procc;ss.
history of this case is sad testimony of what one u11sc:rupulc1us

.11 1 ,1

dealing attorney can do to abuse and disrupt the legal procc>ss

'-''ver-ur

his

own

wrongdoing.

attorney

A

review

of

the

record

below

tc.>

'oc:·ll

clearly reveals

manipulation of the system to cover-up his theft of the

partnershi_e' s funds.
In the early part of 1978, Plaintiff-Appellant, Joseph Mascaro, and
Defendant- Respondent,

Charley Joseph,

purpose of real estate acquisition.
agreement.
a

50/50

formed

There

a

partnership for

the

was no written partnership

The agreement called for them to split partnership profits on

basis

after

expenses

had

been

reimbursed.

( R.

298)

The

partnership then proceeded to attempt to find buyers for the now improved
property with Defendant-Respondent, Joseph, manning the laboring oar,
although he and Plaintiff-Appellant,
make necessary decisions together.
Respondent, Joseph, expended

Mascaro, did discuss strategy and

In fact, in 1977 and 1978 Defendant-

over $10,000.00 in out-of-pocket expenses

in this effort and diverted sufficient energies and attention from his
trucking business so that from 1976 to 1978 gross receipts from

his

trucking business fell from $112,001.61 to $45,040.00, and net profits fell
to $1,595.53.
profit of

This compares to gross receipts of $124,696.00 and a net

$29,956.71

partnership duties.

in

1979

after he

was

relieved of

most of the

{ R. 301-303)

The year following the formation of the partnership, some buyers
presented

themselves

but

none

could

perform.

structured with a Mr. Paul Tanner, but it too stalled.
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Finally

a

( R. 300)

deal

was

That was

the fateful point at which attorney Johns. Davis injected himself into the
,,.uun.

Even the manner in which attorney Davis injected himself into

c1tfairs of the Mascaro/Joseph partnership was ethically appalling.
111s

appearance in this matter was indicative of how he was to handle

tum self unW the court below, by order, forced him to withdraw as counsel.
However,

at the

time,

Defendant-Respondent,

Joseph,

and

Plaintiff-

Appellant, Mascaro, thought they had found their savior. ( R. 299,300,462)
Neither partner knew attorney Davis.
business,

Defendant- Respondent,

In the course of his trucking

Charley Joseph,

had hired

attorney

father-in-law to do some work for him on a sub-contract basis.
When

Defendant-Respondent, Joseph, wasl"!'t paid, he had a hard time

paying Davis' father-in-law.

Davis became involved in the collection.

Defendant-Respondent, Joseph, paid most of the money owed and then
described his real estate deal that was pending, for which the partnership
had a buyer, one Paul Tanner, and asked attorney Davis to wait to collect
the balance unW the partnership real estate deal closed. (R. 299)

When

attorney Davis learned that Defendant-Respondent, Joseph, was involved
in a good sized real estate deal that was about to close, he became very

excited and strongly urged Joseph to let him (Davis) represent them in
closing the deal with Tanner, the buyer.
that

he

knew

Tanner

and

could

( R. 299,300,461)
make

him

perform.

Davis claimed
Defendant-

Respondent, Joseph, met with attorney Davis, and then both partners met
with attorney Davis.

At this second meeting, attorney Davis told them

that he knew that Tanner was in financial trouble but that he (Davis)
•"JUld get the money out of Tanner or help them find a new buyer, as he had
,1

lot

of

contacts.

( R .299)

Based

on
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these

representations,

the

partnership agreed to hire attorney

Davis. ( R.

Ji10,4n 1)

What happened over the course of the next three years bee<

·r1.es

0

case history in the abuse of the professional trust accordood an dUc,rnv:; tJ 1
his clients and the trust accorded an attorney by the courts by reasori of
his oath, code of ethics and position as an officer of the court.

Initially,

attorney Davis appeared to work actively to bring to fruition the sale of
the property.

And, as the process drug on, the partners came to rely more

and more on attorney Davis. ( R.300,461-62)

While the process continued

to drag on, Defendant- Respondent, Joseph, continued to do virtually all of
the leg work for the partnership, but relied more and more on attorney
Davis' legal expertise and sophistication to control the transaction.
299)

Finally a closing with a certain Chatillion, Inc., a Utah corporation

owned and operated by a Curtis Baum, was arranged.
the

( R.

closing,

partial

consideration

in

the

Within a few days of

amount

of

approximately

$140,000.00 in cash was received by attorney Davis as a down payment.
The balance of approximately $240,000.00 due the partnership was to be
received in the form of eight lots in Weber County represented by Baum to
have that value.

( R. 300)

placed by attorney

The original $100,000.00 cash payment was

Davis into his trust fund.

( R.

300,450)

Of that

amount, Defendant- Respondent, Joseph, directed attorney Davis to give
$40,000.00

to

Taylor,

$20,000.00

to

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Mascaro,

$20,000.00 to himself (Joseph), and to retain the balance in trust in the
event of potential legal disputes threatened by Tanner.

( R. 300)

Rather

than doing as directed, attorney Davis issued $20,000.00 to Joseph, and
unbeknownst to either Mascaro or Joseph, and without their permissior.,
attorney Davis embezzled approximately $100,000.00 of the closing monies
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to his own use.
, r1r1:al

( R.

450-460)

What then happened would make the most

critic of the legal system shudder with disbelief as attorney Davis

,,,dd"d to himself his knowledge of the legal process to cover-up for as

Jung

as

possible

his own

misconduct,

while

burying his client in

a

procedural quagmire.
To understand how he was able to so effectively prevent DefendantRespondent, Joseph, from taking the steps that would force the issues to be
examined on their merits, and necessarily reveal his own self-dealing, one
must understand the emotional hold that attorney Davis had on Joseph.
Both Mascaro and Joseph had for the past year put complete trust and
faith in Davis (R. 300,664)

They had increasingly relied on him to handle

what has become for them something that was too big and complex to
understand.

( R. 300) As the real estate transaction initiated by the

Mascaro/Joseph partnership became increasingly complex, Mr. Joseph came
to rely more and more on Attorney Davif!' superior knowledge and training.
(R. 300,462,

see pp. 22,29,35,37,40,41.45, Deposition of CharleyJoseph,

&

June 18, 1981.)

Mr. Joseph was constantly in touch with Attorney Davis

asking for advice and guidance.

Eventually Mr. Joseph relied on Attorney

Davis to personally handle the negotiations and other details as Attorney
Davis saw fit.

Additionally, Attorney Davis represented Mr. Joseph in

other legal matters, in which Charley Joseph relied totally on Attorney
Davis'

legal

expertise.

( R.

300,462)

The

fiduciary

nature

of the

relationship between Attorney Davis and Mr. Joseph was long term, total
and complete:
1<

Mr. Joseph totally trusted and relied on Attorney Davis.

lien the present lawsuit was commenced, attorney Davis again persuade

Defendant-Respondent Joseph that he was the only one who knew the facts
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well enough to properly defend him.

(R. 301,462,463)

In response to his

inquiries, Davis kept reassuring Joseph that everythiny w us uncler urntrul
It wasn't until actual proof of Davis' embezzlement of the trust funclo, that
Joseph could emotionally accept that his attorney had

embezzled the

partnership money, and had buried him in a default Judgment for over
$300,000.00 in monies which he, Joseph, had never received. ( R. 301,46263)
The record indicates that Attorney Davis and Mr. Joseph were both
served on May 5, 1980. (r. 14-17)

Attorney

Davis had committed his

embezzlement of the majority of the partnership funds in June, 1979,
nearly one full year before the suit. ( R. 450-460)

The day following the

service of summons, Mr. Joseph called Attorney Davis and requested that
Davis take whatever steps were necessary and proper to represent him.
(R. 301,702-03)

over the next several months Mr. Joseph spoke with

Attorney Davis repeatedly and consistently about the status of the lawsuit
and Attorney Davis told him not to wo=y and that everything was taken
care of.

( R. 704,462,301)

Mr. Joseph in fact did believe that Attorney

Davis was defending him and representing his interests.

Mr. Joseph, who

is a trucker and who has little education or sophistication in legal matters,
did not personally know what was necessary and proper to defend and
represent him, but he fully believed that his attorney had done and was
doing

whatever

interest.

was proper and

(R. 300,462)

most advantageous in protecting his

Davis did subsequently tell Mr. Joseph's wife

that he had in fact filed an answer.
In fact,

( R. 467-68)

Attorney Davis had not filed an answer on behali of Mr.

Joseph, nor made any other responsive pleading.
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Rather, Attorney Davis

had intentionally and deliberately allowed the entering of the default
"i"tnst
1 11<=

pi

Mr. aoseph and himself as the first step in an elaborate scheme.

purpose of the scheme was to avoid litigation on the merits, thus

eventing, or at least delaying, the discovery process which would lead to

the revelation of his embezzlement.
stepping

the

merits

and

Secondly, by procedurally side-

concentrating

on

motions

and

procedures

tangential to the real issues, Attorney Davis hoped to "consume" enough
time to hopefully structure a settlement with all parties, and in that
manner avoid discovery of his embezzlement.

Finally, in the event he was

not successful in avoiding the discovery process long enough to effect a
settlement, the fact that there was a judgment against him would render
moot the question of what happened to the partnership funds in his trust
account: i.e., the sole issue would be execution of the judgment.
Attorney
He

scheme was, to a frightening degree, successful.

fraudulently used his position as an officer of the Court and fiduciary

to his client to manipulate and pervert the process of justice to l)
effectively delay discovery of his own embezzlement for nearly two and
one-half years, and, 2) to effectively manipulate the judicial process in
such a way that the full weight of a default judgment in excess of $300,000
rests on Mr. Joseph.
the Court.

Argument I below closely examines the record before

such an examination clearly reveals Attorney Davis' scheme

as outlined above, and how successful it has been.

8.

Settlement Agreement

Gn May 4, 1982, one week prior to the time set for trial of PlaintiffAppellants'

claims

and

Defendant-Responden1='s
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cross-claims

against

Defendants Baum and ChatilJion, Inc., a pre-trial conference was held.
In conformance

with the order of the court.

each rarty was present

personally and represented by counsel of record.
court, negotiations for settlement began.

With the help nf

tile_

These negoUations took the

pattern of meetings among the attorneys, followed by conferences of the
attorneys with their respective clients, followed by further negotiations
among the attorneys, and so on.

After two hours, a stipulated settlement

was achieved which compromised and settled a great many of the issues of
dispute among the parties.

Once the settlement amongst the parties had

been achieved, a final conference was held in the court's chambers.
party was present, with counsel, in the court's chambers.

Each

At that time,

the terms of the settlement were read to and approved by the court.

As a

result, the trial date scheduled for the following week was struck.

None

of

these

facts

are

disputed.

(R.

528,529,522,523)

Counsel

for

Defendant- Respondent Joseph, immediately began work on the preparation
of the written documents evidencing the agreement reached. ( R. 531)
After several consultations by telephone among the various counsel for the
parties regarding the wording of the final documents, complete documents
were forwarded to Joseph Rust and Charles Hanna, attorneys for Plaintiffs,
Joseph Mascaro and Shelby Taylor, Duane Burnett, attorney for Defendants
Curtis Baum and ChatilJion, Inc., and to Attorney John

Davis.

These

included a Settlement Agreement, a Stipulation and Motion to Dismiss, and
an Order.

( R. 532)
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Within one or two days of mailing these documents to the above
11a med respective counsel, telephone conversations were had with both
11dne

Burnett and

Charles

Hanna.

Duane Burnett indicated that he

the documents and that he and his clients were ready and willing
to sign them as prepared.

Mr. Charles Hanna, who along with Joseph Rust,

were representing the Plaintiffs, indicated that the documents prepared
were satisfactory with one exception: paragraph 2(b) of the Settlement
Agreement provided that any excess in value represented by the lots
transferred to Plaintiff, Shelby Taylor, which value was beyond $113,000,
would pass to Defendant, Charley Joseph.

Mr.

Hanna argued that any

excess should go to Plaintiff, Joseph Mascaro. ( R. 532)
attempted but not successfully concluded.
dispute

A compromise was

Note, however, that this

was not discussed and reduced to agreement at the pre-trial

conference.

It was not considered.

main

which

issues

were

It is only tangentially related to the

compromised

and

settled

at

the

pre-trial

conference.
In a letter dated June 3, 1982, (R. 555), attorney Joseph Rust, lead
counsel for the Plaintiffs, acknowledged that the documents, as prepared
and submitted for approval as to form, were reflective of the compromise
and settlement successfully bargained for by the respective parties at the
pre-trial conference.

Subsequently,

Defendant

Curtis

Baum,

and his

attorney, Mr. Burnett did supply financial information regarding lot sales
in the Parkvale Subdivision.
delivered to his attorney,

At about the same time, Defendant Baum,

Mr. Burnett, fully executed warranty deeds

the transfer of the specified lots to the parties as agreed.
Shortly thereafter, in a letter dated June 23, 1982, counsel for
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Plaintiffs

acknowledged

the

value

of

the

subJect

lots,

in

Parkvale

Subdivision, as represented by Defendant Baum and Chatj_U1on, Inc (I<
556)

Nevertheless, Plaintiffs indicated in that same letter that they

not intend

to

honor

the

agreement reached

through

dlci

compromise anrl

settlement.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
ATTORNEY JOHN S. DAVIS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS AN
OFFICER OF THE COURT AND AS A FIDUCIARY, DELIBERATELY PERPETRATED FRAUD ON THE COURT WHICH
JUSTIFIES RELIEF UNDER RULE 60(b)(7), U.R.C.P.
A.

The record and facts reveal a clear scheme of an officer of
the court to intentionally defraud the court.
That

Davis

did

in

fact

embezzle

nearly

$100,000

from

the

Joseph/ Mascaro partnership is evident from the record before this Court.
( R.

450-460)

October, 1979.

This

embezzlement occurred

( R. 450-460)

between

June,

1979

and

Charley Joseph and attorney Davis were

served on May 5, 1980 so the embezzlement had already occurred some time
before.

Attorney

only concern was to keep hidden his embez-

zlement, and his representation of Charley Joseph would serve his purpose
nicely.

If he could arrange it so that a default judgment could be entered

against Charley Joseph and himself, there would never be a confrontation
on the issues raised by

s Complaint.

Without a confrontation on

the issues there would be no need for discovery to occur, as the only
relevant issue left would be execution on the judgment.

Further, even if

some discovery was pursued, he would assert the position that what he had
done with his trust account and the partnership funds therein was
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That this

"hefl

as his motive in deliberately allowing the default to be entered

Charley Joseph's knowledge is abundantly clear even from the

!,,,111

',, ,J

iv

before the Court.

In Attorney

deposition of June 18, 1981,

he was pressed about the status of his trust account, he refused to

answer any questions about it.

He refused to even reveal the name of the

bank, on the basis that such an inquiry is irrelevant in that the issue had
been reduced to judgment:
Q. Which bank is that?
A. I don't think I need to answer that one.
Q.

I think it is important, because, of course, it
goes to records that would reflect any
disbursements out of that account.

A. How do you mean?
Q. Well, in other words, to determine exactly the status
of that account, it may become necessary to subpoena
the bank records, as far as determining-A. I don't know that it is necessary at this point.
You have got your Judgment.
(Davis Deposition, June 18, 1981, at p. 59)

Even more indicative of Attorney Davis' deliberate scheme to bring
about the default against Charley Joseph and himself in an attempt to
render moot any inquiry into the issues raised by

Complaint is

the following from the deposition of Charley Joseph, September 23, 1981.
This

deposition

Attorney

occurred following the

gaining access to

trust account records pursuant to Court Order.

Charley

.ioseph was being deposed when Attorney Davis arrived late, realized that
ius

trust account records had been discovered and were being examined by

Charley Joseph; Attorney Davis objected:
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Mr. Davis:
I want to raise one other uLJ<=c,t1on,
How does this relate to the issues at hand thdt
have not already been reduced to judgment?
Mr. Rust:
Well, we have some questions as fdr
as the involvement of Mr. Baum with Chatillion,
Mr. Davis:
account?

In the disbursements of my trust
*************

Mr. Rust:
Dale Potter, that he is preparing a motion
to set aside our previous judgment against Mr. Joseph
and so it would have relevance to any such motion that
is contemplated in that area as well.
so we think
that the area is proper.
Mr. Davis: Wait a minute though, the setting aside
is a procedural matter.
You don't argue the
substance of the case on a sett{ng aside.
If you
want to set aside the judgment, then you've got a
whole different story.
But right now you have
represented to the Court that there was an express
determination why you should take judgement
immediately and you got that.
And all of your
claims which have been raised in your Complaint
have been reduced to judgment and until the
default is recovered, this is not relevant to
the issues at hand.
(Deposition of Charley
Joseph, September 23, 1981 at 13 and 14, R. 657-58)

It is quite clear from the foregoing that Attorney Davis desperately

wanted the issues raised in the Complaint reduced to judgment so that the

status of his trust account would not come under the glaring light of
judicial examination.

In that way he hoped to avoid discovery altogether

of his embezzlement.
The

above is graphic

evidence

of

Attorney

intentionally allowing the default to be entered.

Davis'

motive for

Further evidence of the

fact that he intentionally allowed it to be entered, and that it was not

accident, comes from the fact that Charley Joseph repeatedly contacted
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Attorney

Davis about his failing

to answer on his behalf.

Charley

c•seph's deposition of September 23, 1981, indicates Joseph was quite
,cJcJ111ant that he wanted Attorney Davis to get the answer filed right away:
Q. Charley, you earlier indicated that you recall
being served with a Summons and a Complaint in
this matter, is that correct?

A. Yes.
Q. Would you indicate again what you did upon receiving
that Summons and Complaint?

A. I
get ahold of John the first evening.
The next evening I called him and said, "Hey,
I got a Summons here, did you get one?" And
he said, "No, I haven't got mine yet."
I said
"Well, I got one tod;y." And he said, "I'll
probably be get ting mine tonight or tomo-rrow."
I said, "Okay." So the following day I called
him and he said he got his.
I said, "Do you
want to do mine when you do yours or shall I
get somebody else?" I said "Now, if you_'re
not going to do it, you say so." He said,
"No, I'll do it." My wife was sitting right
there.(Depo. of Joseph,, Sept. 23, 1981, pp.58,59, R. 702-03)
Joseph then asked him several times over the next few days about the
status of the Answer.

In response to these several inquires, Attorney

Davis led him to believe that he was working on the Answer and that it
would be filed on time.
the Answer.

Attorney Davis was well aware of the need to file

He was reminded of it several times.

Q. Did you ask him to go ahead and send it in on your
behalf?

A. I said,
Q.

"You go ahead and answer mine."

What did Mr. Davis reply?

A. He said,

"I'll get it."

Then he took it to Provo
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with him.
Q. Did you ever inquire of him if he had filed that
answer?
A. Many a time.
I called h1rn and sa1d, "How are 1 ou
corning on that response?
Are you going to get it
in?" and he said, 11 Yes 11 •
Q. Were these inquire made before the due date of the
Answer?
A. Oh, yes.
In fact, it was about seven or eight
days before that I called his attention to it
four or five times just in a couple or three
days there.
Q. What was his response?
A.

"We'll get it.
I_'rn working on it and I_'ll get
it.-"
So I just assumed it was all done and
mailed in to the court or wherever it goes.

(Joseph Depa., Sept. 23,

1981 pp.60,61, R.704-05)

Knowing full well that he was not going to answer the Complaint and put at
issue his trust account, he nevertheless led Charley Joseph to believe that
the

Answer

would be

filed

and Joseph relied on him.

Subsequently,

Attorney Davis told CharleyJosepl:'s wife that the Answer had been filed.
(R. 467-68)

The failure to file the

Answer was intentional and not

accidental.
Rule 60(b)(l)

allows a

judgment to be set aside for

"mistake,

inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" if such motion is filed within
three months of the entry of judgment.

As defaults are not favored,

Courts are generally favorably disposed to setting aside a default upon
such a

motion timely made.

Attorney Davis was well aware that the

default judgment had been taken.

(Affidavit of Bert waunacott R 64)

Yet he made no effort to have the default set aside within the time limits
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0£ Rule 60(b)(l).

In view of his strong motive to avoid a trial on the

''' ·''• which would necessarily litigate the status of his trust account,
'"ily reasonable explanation for his failure to make a motion under Rule
t•'J(

b) ( 1) is that he intentionally failed to do so.

Only an officer of the

court and a fiduciary having the trust of his client could be in a position to
perpetrate such a fraud.
The second part of Attorney Davis' plan to use the judicial process to
cover-up his embezzlement was that he would use his knowledge of legal
procedure to "consume" as much time as possible by procedurally sidestepping the real issue.

A look at the record will suffice to indicate how

successful he was at this.

The record before the Court is replete with

procedural foot work, but there has never once been a hearing dealing with
the

merits

of the

case.

Temporary

Restraining

Orders,

Preliminary

Injunctions, Motions to Stay, even a Motion to Alter or Amend a Written
Order. Attorney Davis was attentive only when dealing with the side
issues.

In Charley JosepJ:'s Deposition of September 23, 1981,

reveals his intention in this regard.

Davis

As pointed out above, he (Davis)

arrived late and found out to his surprise that all of his trust account
records had been discovered and were being examined.

He made several

objections to the examination of these records based on the fact that a
judgment had been entered and that the records were now irrelevant.
Attorney Rust met some of these objections by asserting that Attorney
Potter was preparing a motion to have the judgment set aside.

Attorney

Davis then asserted the position that on procedural matters one does not
get to the substance of the case.

In so arguing, Attorney Davis gives us a

clear view of his scheme:
-Page 15-

Mr. Davis:
Wait a minute though.
The settltllJ aside
is a procedural matter.
You don't argue the
of the case on a setting aside.
If you want tu set .1,,1c1"
the Judgments, then we've got a whole d1ffer<ent st"ry.
But right now you have represented to the court that
there was an expressed determination why yc>u should
take judgment immediately and you got that.
And all
of your claims which have been raised in your complaint
have been reduced to Judgment and until that default
is removed, this is not relevant to the issues at hand.
(Joseph depo.,

Sept. 23,

1981, p.14,

R.658)

Attorney Davis was delaying as long as possible any inquiry into the merits
by diverting

energy toward procedural matters that would not

examine the merits.

It is amazing that he was so successful for so long -

it took nearly one and one-half years following the filing of the lawsuit to
discover his trust account records.

Attorney Davis was doing two things:

burying his client so the default could never be set aside, and at the same
time

occupying

s

energy with

matters that

would delay the

discovery of his trust account.
Knowing now as we do that Attorney Davis in fact did embezzle
nearly

$100,000

from

the

Mascaro/Joseph

partnership,

the

procedural posture of this case becomes easy to understand.
Davis embarked on a

scheme to intentionally manipulate the

machinery to keep the issues raised in the
litigated.

peculiar
Attorney
judicial

Complaint from being

As part of his scheme, he intentionally allowed a

judgment to be entered against himself and his client.

default

He continued the

perpetration of his scheme by energetically engaging in procedural efforts
both to gain time to structure a settlement and to prevent his client from
having the default set aside.

Attorney Davis' fraud is fraud on the court,

by an officer of the court. It

is

a most insidious violation of trust as an
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officer of the court, and is fraud which defiles the court itself.

c,cheme by an officer of the Court to defraud the Court
''fraud upon the Court" which justifies relief under
Rule 60(b)(7) U.R.C.P.
1s

Rule

60(b),

Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions for

setting aside and vacating final judgments and orders.

The Utah Rule is

based on and patterned after Rule 60 (b) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
[loth the Federal and Utah Rule 60(b) provide that:
On motion and upon such terms as are just
the court may in furtherance of Justice
relieve a party or his legal representative
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
for . . . (emphasis added)
The Utah Rule 60(b) continues on to list several, specific, enumerated
grounds for such a motion including subpart (7) (Utah 60(b) (7) corresponds
to Federal 60(b)(6))
reason

which provides as grounds:

justifying relief from

the

operation

" ... or (7) any other

of the

judgment."

This

inherent power to set aside a judgment for any "reason justifying relief"
included in both the Utah and Federal Rule 60(b), is not limited in any way
by any other provision or time constraint contained in the rule.

This

inherent power was emphasized in a note by the Federal Rules Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules:
And the rule expressly does not limit the court,
when fraud has been perpetrated upon it, to
give relief under the saving clause.
As an

-Page 1 7-

illustration of this situation, see Hazel-Atlas
Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., (194·l)---_i22
U.S. 238.
(Committee Note 1946, cited in b
Moores Section 60.33, n.15).

U.S. 238, 64 S.Ct. 997, 88 L.Ed 12SO (1944), referred to

ill

the above

Advisory Committee Note, is the leading U .s. Supreme Court case dealing
with the

fraud

60(b) (6).

contemplated in the

[Utah Rule 60(b) (7) ].

"saving clause" of Federal Rule

In Hazel-Atlas, Hartford Empire Co.

made application for a patent on a certain glass making process.

The

patent office let it be known that they were going to deny the patent.
One of the attorneys for Hartford then wrote an article describing the
product in

glowing

terms and

lauding

its public

benefit.

Hartford's

attorneys persuaded a well-known labor leader in the industry to represent
that he had

written it; it was then published in a

publication under the labor leadei;:' s name.
part on the fraudulent article.

The patent was issued based in

Later Hartford brought an action for

patent infringement against Hazel-Atlas Glass Company.
dismissed

leading industry

suit and Hartford appealed.

The trial court

Hartford then used the

same fraudulent article to persuade the appellate court to reverse and
order judgment for Hartford, and, relying on the article, it did so.

In

1942, some 9 years after judgment had been entered against Hazel-Atlas,
it made a !!:otion in the original appellate court to have the judgment set
aside.

The appellate court felt it did not have the authority because or

the time lapse and the expiration of the term in which the Judgment was
entered.
on appeal to the

u .s.

Supreme Court, the judgment against Hazel-
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Atlas Company was set aside and the trial court was directed to re-enter
· •,

order of dismissal against Hartford.

In so doing, the court

11s1dered the great need of finality of judgments and the necessity of
pulting an end to litigation.
years

between

the

Judgment

It also considered the time lapse of some 9
and

the

mot.ion

to

have

it

set

aside.

Nevertheless, in spite of all of the persuasive arguments militating against
setting aside the judgment, the Court declared that some frauds on the
court are "sufficiently gross" that the Court must take action to correct
the injustice.

The Supreme Court pointed out that this is an equitable

power of ancient origin that the Courts exercise cautiously, "But where
the

occasion

has

demanded,

where

enforcement

of the

judgment is

manifestly unconscionable, they have wielded the power without hesita322 U .s. at 244, 45 (emphasis added).

tion."

The Court also pointed out

that in a case where it would be "manifestly unconscionable" to allow the
enforcement of a judgment, the relief granted may take several different
forms.

But the Court emphasized that:
" ... whatever form the relief has taken in particular
cases, the net result in every case has been the
same: where the situation has required the Court
has in some manner, devitalized the judgment even
though the term at which it was entered had long
passed away.
322 U.S. at 245 (emphasis added).

It is quite clear from the holding in the Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. case
that when a particularly "gross injustice" has occurred, or when the
enforcement of a judgment would be manifestly unconscionable, Courts
have the power to taKe whatever action is necessary to eliminate the
rnJustice.

In Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. the Supreme Court not only set aside

the nine-year-old judgment, it ordered the trial court to enter a dismissal
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against Hartford.
Having

determined that

Courts have

the

power

to sel aside a

judgment or otherwise "devitalize" it, even in the face of the stronq ['nLfr,
in favor of the finality of judgments, and even after a lapse of su111e g
years, the question remains,
power be

evoked; In

equitable

power to

when should this extraordinary equitable

Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. the
reverse

the

effects

of

a

Court exercised this
deliberate

scheme

to

perpetrate a fraud on the Court itself by an attorney for one of the
litigants.

The very institution set up to administer justice was duped by

an officer of the Court in a deliberate scheme, and as a result, the organ
for the administration of justice was defrauded into working an injustice.
The integrity of the judicial system itself was impeached.

In speaking to

this, the court said:
Furthermore, tampering with the administration of
justice in the manner indisputably shown here
involves far more than in injury to a single
litigant.
It is a wrong against the institutions
set up to protect and safeguard the public,
institutions in which fraud cannot complacently be
tolerated consistently with the good order of society.
Hazel-Atlas Glass, supra at 246.
The present case is controlled by the principles of Hazel-Atlas
Glass

indeed the facts of the present case are even more aggravated.

Attorney

Davis,

as an officer of the

Defendant Joseph.

But

instead

of

Court,

undertook to represent

representing

Charley

Joseph,

he

intentionally embarked on a deliberate scheme to manipulate the judicial
process to cover up his embezzlement and to insulate himself from the
consequences thereof, while at the same time, causing the power of the
judicial

machinery

to

press

its

full

weight
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against

his

client.

In

retrospect, and now knowing that Attorney Davis had, in fact, embezzled
rhe partnership funds a year before the commencement of

this lawsuit, his

, 11\,erate scheme to pervert the judicial system for his own purpose is
. 1u1t.e clear.

He intentionally allowed the default judgment to be entered

against Charley Joseph and himself and then embarked on a series of
procedural maneuvers designed to avoid and delay a confrontation on the
merits, at the same time attempting to exhaust all post judgment remedies
normally available to a litigant, thus insuring that the default judgment
against Charley Joseph would not be set aside.
The case of McKinney v. Boyle (9th Cir., 1968) 404 F. 2d 632,
presents another factual situation quite similar to the present case.
McKinney,

the

Plaintiff's

own

attorney

conspired

with

In

Plaintiff's

estranged wife to settle, without his permission, his claims for personal
injuries.

He was out of the country when the settlement was made.

He

received nothing from the settlement. Upon returning to this country, some
five years after the settlement was entered, he learned of the settlement.
He moved under 60(b) to have the settlement set aside based on fraud and
deceit by his own attorney.

The District Court denied the motion, but on

appeal, the denial was reversed.

The appellate court in so ruling, pointed

out this type of fraud was different than the type contemplated in Federal
Rule 60(b) (3) which has a time limit.

In differentiating between 60(b) (3)

and 60(b)(6) [Utah 60(b)(7)] the Court said:
But the main charge made by Plaintiff is
fraud on the part of his own counsel and
his former wife.
This, we think brings
him within ground (6), as to which there
is no fixed time limit.
McKinney, supra,
at 624 (emphasis added).
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What the Court in .1'.!E_Kinney found so repugnant was the fiict, as here, that
a litigan1:'s owr. attorney had manipulated the Judicial system to defrc,u<J

his own client.

Not only was an officer of the court 111volved rn the fraud

itsel£, but as in the present case, it was the part:(s own attorney who
perpetrated the fraud to compromise his client's rights.

The

Court

emphasized that the tampering with the judicial process, by an attorney, to
undermine
Court.

The

own clien1:'s interests clearly amount to fraud on the
Court did

not need to engage in

any semantic or legal

gymnastics to grant relief to the petitioner.
We need not perform a semantic tour-de-force
to achieve the result we reach, as Judge
Learned Hand did in United States v. Karachalis,
(2 Cir., 1953) 205 F. 2d 331, 335.
That case
did not involve a charge of fraud directed at a
own counsel or his wife; this one does.
In the case of Lockwood v. Boyles, (o.o.c., 1969) 46 FRD 625, the
Court was asked to set aside a 14-year-old judgment based on allegations
of perjury committed by a witness.

In denying the motion, the Court

enunciated the rule it felt was controlling in motions based on 60(b) [Utah
60(b)(7)- "any other relief"] "fraud on the court".

They stated the rule

as follows:
"Fraud upon the court" should, we believe
embrace only that species of fraud which
does, or attempts to, defile the court
itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by
officers of the court so that the judicial
machinery can not perform in the usual
manner its impartial task of adjudging
cases that are presently for adjudication.
Fraud inter partes, without more, should
not be fraud upon the court, but redress
should be left to a motion under 60(b) (3)
-Page 22-

or to the independent action.
at 631 (emphasis added).
,,, f1!1e

46 ¥.R.D.

the G.S. Supreme Court in Hazel-Atlas, supra, did not so restrict

hU(liJ(6)

[Utah

Rule 60(b)(7)] motions for "fraud on the court", the

present case easily fits into this more restrictive definition presented in
Lock::-:'ood.

Attorney Davis' scheme of pretending to represent defendant

Joseph so he could cover-up his own embezzlement, is unquestionably fraud
by an

officer of the Court which "does attempt to defile the Court

itself ... so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner
its impartial task ..• "

Lockwood, supra, at 631.

In Mallonee v. Grow, Alaska, 502 P. 2d 432 (1972), the court granted
relief to a party moving to have a five-year-old judgment set aside on
motion pursuant to 60(b)(6) [Utah 60(b)(7)] for fraud on the court.

The

fraud in Mallonee was not nearly so gross nor extensive as that in the
!!azel-Atlas case, supra, or McKinney, supra.

But in Mallonee, the Court

found it significant that an attorney was involved in the fraud.

The

Mallonee court distinguished Lockwood v. Boyles on the grounds that in
Lock::-:'ood, no attorney was involved in the fraud on the court:
Lockwood involved an attempt to set aside a
14-year-old judgment based on allegations of
perjury conunitted by a witness.
The Court
pointed out that there was no "involvement
of an attorney, (an officer of the court)."
Accordingly, the most that was claimed was
the fraud of an adverse party.
Mallonee was represented by counsel who
participated in filing pleadings which grossly
overstated the amount due, in levying on
property not owned by the judgment debtor
and in failing to serve notice of the motion
to confirm sale.
An attorney is an officer
of the court.
Mallonnee, supra, at 438.
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The Court went on to quote from 7 Moores Federal Practice, 60'33 at

613, defining types of conduct by an attorney, as an officer, which amount.<
to fraud on the Court:
While he should represent his client with
singular loyalty that loyalty obviously
does not demand that he act dishonestly
or fraudulently: on the contrary his loyalty
to the Court, as an officer thereof, demands
integrity and honest dealing with the court.
And when he departs from that standard in
the conduct of a case he perpetrates a
fraud upon the Court.
Mallonee, supra,
at 438.
Finally, the Alaska Court defined the type of conduct referred to by the
Court in Lockwood v. Boyles, supra, in which an officer of the Court
perpetrates fraud so that "the judicial machinery can not perform in the
usual manner its impartial task of adjudging":
Such fraud includes behavior which defiles
the Court itself and which results in the
inability of the judicial machinery to perform
in the usual manner its impartial task of
adjudicating cases.
The adjudicative
integrity of a Court may be defiled by the
behavior of parties or attorneys which
results in depriving adverse parties of
substantive rights.
mallonne, supra, at 438.
Certainly Attorney

conduct in purposely manipulating th<

judicial machinery to prevent his client from asserting his meritoriow
defenses and counterclaims (which defenses would have quickly expose<
Attorney

embezzlement of partnership funds) deprived defendan·

Joseph of substantive rights.

Such conduct was manifestly repugnant tc

the standards of "integrity" and "honest dealing with the Court" require<
of an attorney as an officer of the court.
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Sutter v. Easterly, Mo., 189

s. W.

2d 284 (1945) presents another

·rise where an attorney, as an officer of the Court, conspired to defraud
'"

Court.

In

Sutter,

the

attorney

knowingly

-v1dence in order to obtain a judgment.

produced

fabricated

The court, in setting aside the

Juclg m ent, said:
"Peters' scheme and conspiracy were such a
violation of a lawyer's duty to the courta duty imposed not alone by principles of
honesty and good morals but also by a code
of ethics adopted as rules of court, as to
amount to a fraud on the court for which
equity will grant relief."
Sutter, supra,
at 289.
The Sutter court relied heavily on the Hazel-Atlas decision, supra, and
after quoting extensively from Hazel-Atlas stated:
"While the facts in the Hazel-Atlas case shows
more extensive fraud, and one in which the
client participated, the decision is authority
for the principle that where a lawyer engages
in a conspiracy to commit a fraud upon the
Court by the production of fabricated evidence
and by such means obtains a judgment then the
enforcement of the judgment becomes "manifest!¥
unconscionable" and a court equity may devitalize
the judgment.
Sutter, supra, at 289.
This Court is presented with a very ugly and distressing set of
circumstances.

Attorney Davis, as a fiduciary to his client, occupied a

position of trust which he violated.

Attorney Davis was also an officer of

the Court and held a position of trust with the Court.
violated both of these trusts.

He purposely

He did so to cover-up his own fraud and

embezzlement of his client's funds from his attorney's trust account.

In

so doing, Attorney Davis intentionally engaged in a scheme to tamper with
•he

process

of justice

with

the

purpose
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of denying

his

client the

substantive right of a fair hearing on the merits of his case.

The Judicial

machinery in this case has been prevented, by fraud, from admmGLenn,-1
justice in the usual way.
not be allowed to stand.

The judgment by default entered herein shout"
By virtue of the

decision.

dnd tlie

law set forth in the cases cited above, the court below clearly had the
authority pursuant to Rule 60(b) (7) to set aside the default judgment that
has been entered, therefore acted properly in modifying and setting aside
so much of said judgment as was necessary to devitalize that part of said
judgment that was unconscionable.

c.

Attorney Davis' fraud prevented Charley Joseph from having
the opportunity to litigate his case on the merits, and was
therefore extrinsic fraud and justified relief under Rule
60 (b) ( 7).
The case of Hazel-Atlas Glass

supra, and the other cases

examined above, all dealt with fraud perpetrated by an officer of the Court
pursuant to a

scheme to defraud.

None of the cases considered it

necessary to deal with the notions of extrinsic versus intrinsic fraud; the
above Courts apparently felt no need to wrestle with the traditional
distinction.

The fact that the judicial system itsel£ had been defiled by

officers of the Court in such a way as to preclude the proper and normal
administration of justice was enough in and of itsel£ to justify granting
relief under 60 (b) ( 7) for "any other reason justifying relief"

without

submitting to the mental and legal gymnastics attendant to making a
distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud.

Indeed many jurisdic-

tions no longer follow the old extrinsic/ir,trinsic dichotomy and instead
consider the seriousness of the fraud, the harshness of the result, and
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intervening equities, i£ any.

Nevertheless, even under the old notions of

, 'lrrnsic versus inuinsic fraud,
,.[<J

the default judgment entered herein

t,e set aside as the fraud involved was extrinsic.

Extrinsic fraud is defined in

7 Moores Federal Practice section

60.31[1] at 613 as follows:

"Fraud is extrinsic where a party is prevented
by trick, artifice or other fraudulent conduct
from fairly presenting his claim or defenses
or introducing relevant or material evidence.
Moores, supra, citing United States v.
Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878) and others.
The present case falls squarely within the above definition.
Charley Joseph was prevented from
Attorney

Davis'

fraudulent

Defendant

"fairly presenting his defenses" by

conduct

as

set out above.

In spite of

Defendant Joseph's adamant exhortations and frequent reminders to file an
appropriate answer, Attorney Davis did not.
so.

He intentionally did not do

He purposely worked to his own client's defeat in order to protect

himself.
The leading case on extrinsic fraud is United States v. Throck!!'Orton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878).

In Throck_!!!orton, the Court emphasized that

there needs to be an end to litigation; and when an issue has been fairly
and openly litigated in Court, then a judgment on that issue should remain
final even if based on perjured testimony or a fraudulent document.
l Note that without specifically reversing Throck_!!!orton, the United States

Supreme court has, to a significant degree, abandoned this rule (see
Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589 (1891); Hazel-Atlas Glass Company v.
Hartford Empire Co., supra, and cases cited above in this Memorandum).
JUnetheless, the rule set forth in Throck_!!! orton clearly mandates the
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judgment be set aside if there was in fact no real adversary trial

01

decision as a result of an attorney's fraudulent conduct:
Where the unsuccessful party has been prevented
from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or
deception practiced on him by his opponent,
as by keeping him away from court, a false
promise of a compromise; or ... where an
attorney fraudulently or without authority
assumes to represent a party and connives at
his defeat; or where the attorney regularly
employed corruptly sells out his client's
interest to the other side, - these and
similar cases which show that there has
never been a real contest in the trial or
hearing of the case, are reasons for which
a new suit may be sustained to set aside and
annul the former judgment or decree, and
open the case for a new and fair hearing.
61 U.S. at 65, 66 (emphasis added).
While the facts in Throckmorton did not involve an attorney intentionally
striving for his own client's demise, the Court was quite clear that such a
case would mandate the setting aside of the judgment and allowing a new
trial.

In United States v. Aakenvik ( D.

Ore., 1910) 180 F. 137, the

Court relied on the Throckmorton rule to set aside a judgment where an
attorney did connive to lose.
contemplated
Joseph's

by the

regularly

u.s.

The case before this court is exactly that
Supreme

employed

Court in

counsel

Throckmorton.
--------

connived

at

his

Charley

defeat

and

intentionally and maliciously prevented Mr. Joseph from having a fair
opportunity to present his defense.
In Rice v. Rice, 117 Utah 27, 212 P. 2d 685 (1949) our own Supreme
Court relied on the Throckmorton rule, to amend a decree of distribution of
probate.

The facts in Rice, while not as egregious as the present case,

are similar.

In Rice the executrix, for her own gain, mislead the Court
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with regard to the proper distribution of assets under the will in question.
, 111'

':ourt held that the executrix had a duty to the beneficiaries under the

,.,u

and also a duty to the Court as an officer of the court similar to that

,,f an attorney.

The executrix had defrauded the Court, and that fraud

was extrinsic in that the executrix's actions prevented a fair and full
hearing on the issues.
More recently in Haner v. Haner, 13 Utah 2d 299, 373 P.2d 577
( 196 2) our State Supreme Court upheld its holding in Rice.

Moreover, in

Haner the Court indicated that it would not be bound by the traditional
notions of extrinsic and intrinsic fraud.

The Court said:

"It seems more realistic to say that when it
appears that the processes of justice have
been so completely thwarted or distorted as
to persuade the Court that in fairness and
good conscience the judgment should not be
permitted to stand, relief should be granted.
Haner, supra, at 578.
And, in a very recent case, St. Pierre v. Edmonds, Utah, 656 P.2d
1009 (1982)

this Court held that it would no longer be bound by the old

notions of intrinsic and extrinsic fraud.

Instead it would consider the

seriousness of the fraud and the harshness of the result to determine
whether relief was justified.

Thus the Utah Court has now clearly and

unequivocally declared its intention to follow the rule laid down in
Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589 (1891) and Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v.
Hartford Empire co., supra.

The real question is whether the fraud is of

such a nature that it is "against conscience to execute a judgment."

St.

v. Edmonds, supra.
The present case is clearly one in which the very "processes of
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justice have been so completely thwarted or distorted" by Attorney Davis,
that the

judgment in

permitted to stand.

"fairness

and

Haner, supra.

good

conscience"

should

n<>t

1 ,_

Even under the old rule laid dnwn 'I•

supra, and adhered to in

Rice v. Rice, supra, extrins1c

fraud has been practiced in such a way as to deny defendant Charley Joseph
the right to a full and fair hearing on the merits.

A fortiori, under the

more liberal view expressed in St. Pierre v. Edmonds, supra, and haneE....:::'..:_

!! an er,

supra, which is consistent with the rule set forth in Marshall v.
U.S. 589 (1891) and Hazel-Atlas Glass Company v. Hartford
co., supra, (and other cases cited above) the default judgment in

the present case, intentionally allowed to be entered by reason of the
fraud practiced by Attorney Davis, and which prevented Defendant Joseph
from litigating the issues raised in Plaintiff's Complaint, should be set
aside.

POINT II
JUDGMENT IS FOR UNLIQUIDATED DAMAGES WHICH
HAVE NOT BEEN PROVED AND WHICH ARE NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE PLEADINGS; THE JUDGMENT
IS MANIFESTLY UNJUST, IS VOIDABLE, AND
SHOULD BE SET ASIDE.
The law is well settled that unless damages are for a sum certain (as
in

a

promissory

note)

or

are

capable

of

calculation

by

a

simple

mathematical process (as in computing interest) a default judgment admits
a plaintiff's right to recover something but does not admit the amount he is
entitled

to

recover.

34

C.J. Judgments

Section

176,

Judgments Section 201 (c) Section 216; Hurd v. Ford, 78

359;

49

C.J.S.

Utah 49, 276

P.2d, 908 (1924); bayerle Sand and Gravel, Inc. v. Martinez, 118 Ariz.
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1.11,

574 P.2d 853 (1978); Hallett Const. Co. v. Iowa Highway comm. 258
''?0, 139 N.W. 2d 421 (1966); Becker v. Boothe, 184 Kan. 830, 339

1•

,,f 292 (1959); United National Indemnity Co. v.

120

Zullo, 143 Conn. 124,

A.2d 73 (1956); Hatch v. Sugarhouse Finance Co., 20 Utah 2d 156,

434 P.2d 758 (1967).
With regard to the

necessity of proving unliquidated damages

pursuant to a default judgment, the rule, as expressed in 34 C.J. Judgments
section 1 76, p. 389, is as follows:
"Where the action is for an unliquidated
claim or amount, a default admits plaintiff's right to recover something, but
does not admit the amount to which he is
entitled; this must be established by
proof, on further proceedings to determine
and assess the amount of the judgment, and
there is no final judgment until the amount
is ascertained.
Where the cause of action is such that
Plaintiff, if entitled to recover at all,
is entitled to recover a fixed or liquidated amount, or where the amount of his
damages is ascertainable by pure calculation, defendant's default admits Plaintiff's
right to recover the sum demanded in the
declaration or complaint, and judgment may
be entered therefore, without further proof,
and without an assessment of damages,"
34 c.J. Judgments section 176 at 389.
"Where the amount of plaintiff's claim or
demand is unliquidated, defendant's default
does not admit the amount which plaintiff
is entitled to recover, and it is
incumbent upon plaintiff to prove the
amount.
Under some statutes, where the
amount of plaintiff's claim is ascertainable
by mere calculation, as in an action on a
note, plaintiff is entitled to judgment for
the amount claimed, without any other evidence
thereof.
But the instrument sued on must be
produced or proof of its contents be offered."
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34 C.J. Judgments Section 410, at 190 (emphasis
added)
The rule is that only if the recovery by def a ult is a
liquidated amount, or where the amount of his damages

is

"fixed c, 1

ascertaina.ble

1..

pure calculation, defendants default admits plaintiff's right to recoveL.
34 C.J. section 176, Judgments p. 389.

In all other instances, i.e., where

damages are unliquidated there is no final judgment until the amount of
damages are proved.

49 C.J.s. Judgments, Section 20l{c) thus explains:

"Where the action is in tort or for an
unliquidated claim or amount, a default
admits Plaintiff's right to recover
something, at least nominal damages, but
does not admit the amount to which he is
entitled, and there is no final judgment
until the amount is ascertained, as
discussed infra section 216.
In

Hallett Const. Co. v. Iowa State

520, 139 N. W. 2d 421

258

Iowa

(1966) defaults were entered against the State

Highway Commission upon four separate petitions.

The petitions included

a computation of damages which listed some seven to ten items of damages
{depending on which set of the several petitions were considered) and a
computation of a final figure based on the itemization.

There was also a

statement from an officer of Hallett that the final figure was a "sum
certain 11 •

The court held that the claims were not for a sum certain

merely because it prayed for a specific amount for each alleged item of
damage, and the amount thereof was largely a matter of opinion from which
qualified persons might fairly and honestly differ.
In

the

case

of Ace Grain Co., Inc. v. American Eagle Fire In-

surance Co., {S.O.N.Y., 1951) 11 F.R.D. 364, the insurer of destroyeJ
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cargo hired an independent surveyor to appraise the amount of the damage.
The

plaintiff contended that the appraisal by the surveyor was a sum
In rejecting this argument the Court said:

, ; ,, u1,

"The surveyor's findings represent an opinion
as to value and other factors which the defendant is not required to accept or it is concluded thereby even though it retained the
surveyor. * * * The claimed cargo damage under
an insurance policy, is unliquidated and is
not converted into one for a liquidated amount
or a "sum certain" by a surveyor's report
intended for adjustment or trial purposes.
The defendant has the right to a judicial
determination of the extent of the damages
claimed by plaintiff and the appropriate
method for determining this issue is either
by the Court or upon a reference in accordance
with Rule 55(b) (2)" (emphasis added).
Similarly, in Melville v.

108 Colo. 520, 120 P.2d 189 (1941). a

case involving the dissolution of a trust, the Court found that before an
amount of damages could be assessed in the default, an accounting wa
absolutely

necessary.

Finally,

in

Beyerle Sand and Gravel, Inc. v.

Martinez, 118 Ariz. 60, 574 P.2d 853 (1978). in an action for breach of
lease regarding the replacement of topsoil, the

Court held that the

plaintiffs were not entitled, by virtue of the default judgment, to entry of
judgment for the amount prayed for in their complaint.

The Court said:

"A claim is not for a "sum certain" merely
because it is for a specific amount.
Hallett
construction Com an v. Iowa State Hi hwa
conunission, 258 Iowa 520, 139 H.W.2d 421 1966).
A contrary holding would permit almost any
unliquidated claim to be transformed into a
claim for a sum certain merely by placing a
monetary amount on the item claimed damaged
even though such amount has not been fixed,
settled or agreed upon by the parties and
regardless of the value of the claim.
Nor is
-Page 33-

the claim one which can by computation be
made certain.
Beyerle, supra, at 856.
See also Johanson v. United Truck Lines, 62 Wash. 2d 437, 383 P.2d SU
( 1963) (a default admits plaintiff's right to recover, but does not ad mn
the amount claimed
recovery

in

such

where damages

cases

must

be

are

unliquidated,

established

by

and

amount of

proof)

and

Kelly

Broadcasting co., Inc. v. sovereign Broadcasting, Inc., Nev., 606 P.2d
1089 ( 1980) (where default judgment is neither for a sum certain, nor for a
sum which can be made certain from computation, plaintiff must prove his
damages).
In the instant case there was never a hearing as to damages and no
proof was ever been offered to sustain damages in any amount.

As a

result, the default judgment, as entered, contains numerous errors.

There

is an admitted error in the amount of damages awarded in that the total
award

is

over-stated

by

$83,000,

plus

interest.

(Tesch

Affidavit,

The largest part of the remaining amount of damage

February 16, 1982).

was for prospective partnership profits: in affect an account receivable.
Such

prospective

partnership

profits

constituted

an

asset

of

the

partnership, and the partners each had the right to one-half of such an
asset, when and i f the partnership could successfully collect it.

But the

collection of such an asset was prospective, and indeed doubtful at that.
certainly one partner was not liable to the other for such prospective,
uncollected profits.

Thus, in addition to the mathematical error, the

amount of the judgment is further overstated by $120,000.

Further, the

judgment as entered made no provision for partnership expenses which had
been

incurred

and

which

amounted

to
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several

thousand

dollars.

l\dditionally, of the monies received by the partnership, and deposited in
he trust account of the partnership's attorney, approximately $100,000
embezzled by John Davis. The record before this Court reveals that of
Charley Joseph did not receive any of it, nor was he

·Ji"t $100,000,

benefitted in any way by it.

(R. 450-60)

It was embezzled from the

partnership and each partner must sustain one-half of the loss,
addition to the $83,000 math error described above, the

Thus, in

judgment was

overstated by one-half the amount of money (approximately $100,000)
embezzled by Attorney Davis.
In view of the fact that no hearing was held to determine the proper
amount of damages as is required, that the judgment is not supported by the
pleadings, that there is an obvious and gross mathematical error in the
amount awarded by the default judgment in the approximate amount of
$83,000, that the amount of damages awarded for partnership profits is
without basis at law or in equity, the judgment is void, is manifestly
unjust, and should be set aside.

POINT III
THE PLEADINGS DO NOT SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT.
An

examination

of

Plaintiff's

Complaint

reveals

that in

the

Plaintiff's first cause of action, each and every allegation contained
therein is directed against Attorney Johns. Davis.

(Plaintiff's only other

cause of action in the complaint is directed solely toward defendants Baum
and Chatillion),

There is only one allegation that is directed against

,;harley Joseph, and that is directed primarily at Attorney John Davis, and
rn

the

alternative,

toward

Charley Joseph.
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That said allegation is

Paragraph 31; it reads as follows:
"Upon information and belief, defendant Davis
has commingled his client's funds with his own
and he alone or he and defendant Joseph have
diverted the plaintiff's funds to his or their
own use. ' 1

The above allegation deals only with the partnership funds received by the
partnership and turned over to Attorney Davis to be placed in his trust
account.

It is not in dispute that the vast majority of the funds received

by the partnership, and placed in the trust account, were embezzled by
Attorney Davis for his own use.
Other than Paragraph 31

of Plaintiff's Complaint,

not a

single

allegation is made against Charley Joseph. Each and every other allegation
is directed solely and entirely against Attorney John
there are two legal issues raised.

s.

Davis.

Thus,

The first is a question of a default

judgment that is not supported by the plaintiff's complaint.

The second is

with regard to the one allegation against defendant Charley Joseph that is
made, i.e., the misuse of the partnership funds received by Attorney Davis
and placed in his trust account.

This brief will first address the issue of

the failure of the default judgment to be supported by the pleadings.
It is a fundamental rule that a default judgment, is limited to the
allegations contained in the complaint.
104

(1884);

Thompson v. Wooster, 114 U.S.

Nishimatsu Construction Co., Ltd. v. Houston National

Bank, (5th Cir., 1975). 515 F.2d 1200; Intermountain Food Equipment co.
Idaho, 383 P.2d 612; Southern Arizona School for Boys, Inc.
v. Chery, 119 Ariz. App. 277, 580 P.2d 738 (1978).

Furthermore, even

though the prayer may ask for general relief, the judgment must rest on the
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well pleaded facts of plainti£f's complaint.
r1t

, I.

Co. v.

Intermountain Food Equip-

Waller, supra, Cobb v. Cobb, supra, Nishimatsu Const. Co.,

":..:...._!:! ouston National Bank, supra.
In the case of Cobb v. Cobb, 233 P.2d 423 (Idaho, 1951), the Court

stated the rule as follows:
"A judgment for plaintiff by default must
strictly conform to, and be supported by,
the allegations of the petitioner complaint.
Cobb, supra, at 424 (citing 49 C.J.S. Judgments,
Section 214, p. 378)."
And in a more recent case, the Filth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Nishimatsu Const. co., Ltd. v. Houston National Bank, supra, vacated a
default judgment for the following reason:
"There must be a sufficient basis in the pleadings
for the judgment entered. As the supreme Court
stated in the "venerable but still definitive case"
of Thompson v. Wooster: A default judgment may be
lawfully entered only "according to what is proper
to be decreed upon the statement of the bill, assumed
to be true", and not "as of course according to the
prayer of the bill", 114 u.s. at 113. The
defendant is not held to admit facts that
are not well pleaded or to admit conclusions
of law.
In short, despite occasional statements
to the contrary, a default is not treated as an
absolute confession by the defendant of his
liability and of the plaintiff's right to
recover. Nishimatsu, supra, at 1206 (emphasis
in original)".
The default judgment that is not supported by well pleaded factual
allegations is thus void.

In Price v. Sun Master, 27 Ariz. App. 771, 558

P.2d 966 (1976). the Court said:
"If a complaint fails to state facts legally
entitling plaintiff to recovery, a default
judgment rendered thereon is void." (citing
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Walls v. Stewart Buildin and Roofing supplv,
Inc., 23 Ariz. App. 123, 521 P.2d 167
1975

***********
Even though two years have elapsed since the
void judgment was entered, the judgment must
be set aside and vacated.
Price v. Sun Master,
supra, at 969.

The fact that the plaintiff could have pleaded legally sufficien1

grounds in his complaint is not enough; the complaint must present a lega
cause

of action.

This

was the issue

presented in

Ness v. Greater

Arizona Realty, Inc., 21 Ariz. App. 231, 517 P.2d 1278 (1974).

In Ness

the plaintiff alleged that a promissory note she signed was signed by her a
an agent for and on behalf of the defendants.
not appear on the note.

The defendant's names di

The Court stated that plaintiff could hav

pleaded that defendants were liable to her on the underlying obligation fc

which the note was given, but this she failed to do, and the Court set asid
a default judgment entered in her favor.
While plaintiffs Taylor and Mascaro may have alleged sufficier
facts to support the default judgment as against Attorney Davis, they mac
no factual allegations against defendant Charley Joseph
the trust account funds (see below).

except

as t

Therefore, the default judgment<

to the defendant Charley Joseph is void and should have been vacated ar
set aside.
With regard to the one allegation made in plaintiff's complai
against

defendant

Charley

joseph,

i.e.,

paragraph

31

of

Plaintiff

Complaint, the allegation is directed primarily against Attorney Davis a 1
only in the alternative against defendant Charley Joseph.
refers primarily to funds that Attorney
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The allegati<

Davis deposited in his tru

account
f•'re

when acting as an attorney for the partnership.
this

The record

Court clearly reveals that Attorney Davis embezzled the

''""'- part of those funds (nearly $100,000 for his own use).
POINT IV
THE AGREEMENT REACHED THROUGH
compromise AND SETTLEMENT SHOULD
BE ENFORCED
It is a basic rule that the law fa vars the settlement of disputes.

Rio

Algom Corporation v. Jirnco, LTD., Utah, 618 P.2d 497 (1980), Tracey
Collins Bank and Trust Co. v. Travelstead, Utah, 592 P.2d 605 (1979),
International Motor Rebuilding Co. v. United Motor Exchange, Inc.,
193

Kan. 497,

393

P.2d 992

(1964),

Lomas

&

Nettleton co. v. Tiger

Enterprise, Inc., 99 Idaho 539, 585 P.2d 949 (1978). as a result, i f a
dispute is compromised and settled, such a settlement is binding upon the
parties thereto and

may be enforced by either party.

Tracy Collins

Bank and Trust Co. v. Travelstead, Utah, 592 P.2d 605 (1979); Flott v.
Mfg. Co., 189 Kan. 80, 367 P.2d 44 (1962); See also, 15A
Am.Jur. 2d Compromise and Settlement Sections 7

&

25.

In the recent case of Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Co. v. Travelstead, Utah, 592 P.2d 605 (1979), the Utah supreme Court upheld the
trial court's summary enforcement of a settlement agreement.
enforcing the terms of the settlement agreement,

the

In strictly

Court clearly

enunciated the proper rule regarding the enforcement of an agreement
reached through compromise and settlement:
SettlemP.nts are favored in the law,
and should be encouraged, because
of the obvious benefits accruing
not only to the parties, but also
to the judicial system.
An ex-Page 39-

peditious means of enforcing a
settlement agreement is conducive
to this policy of law in that it
adds the presence of judicial finality to the agreement, insuring that
the goals of the parties as expressed
in the agreement can be speedily
attained.
Travelstead, supra, 592
P.2d at 607.
The majority of the courts in our sister states also recognize such a
rule of strictly and summarily enforcing agreements reached through
compromise and settlement.

In Lomas

&

Nettleton Co. v. Tiger Enter-

prise, Inc., 99 Idaho 359, 585 P.2d 949 (1978), the Idaho Supreme court
stated the rule as follows:
Because there is an obvious public
policy favoring the amicable settlement of litigation, ••• agreements
accomplishing this will be disregarded
only for the strangest of reasons.
Furthermore, such reasons must be
shown by clear and convincing evidence.
Lomas, supra at 585 P.2d 952.
Similarly in Connor v. Hammer, 201 Kan. 22, 439 P.2d 116 (1968)
that court states:
The law favors the compromise and
settlement of disputes and when
parties, in the absence of an
element of fraud or bad faith,
enter into an agreement settling
and adjusting a dispute, neither
party is permitted to repudiate
it. Connor, supra, 439 P.2d at
118 and 119.
And in Greater Anchora e Area Borough v. Cit
Alaska, 504 P.2d 1027 1976 the court ruled:

of Anchorage,

sound judicial policy dictates that
private settlements and stipulations
between the parties are to be favored
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and should not be lightly set asi<le.
Greater Anchorage, supra, 504 P.2d
at 1031.
And for a particularly thorough discussion of the law of compromise
"'d settlement see the case of International Motors Rebuilding Co. v.
United Motor Exchange, Inc., 193 Kan. 497, 393 P.2d 992 (1964). in which
case the court emphasized that absent a strong showing of fraud or bad
faith, neither party may be allowed to repudiate an agreement reached
through

compromise

and

settlement.

See

also

Service Oil co. v.

Coleman Oil Co., (1st Cir., 1972) 470 F.2d 925; Ranta v. Rake, 91 Idaho
376, 421 P.2d 747 (1966); Gordon H. Ball, Inc. v. Oregon Erecting co.,
273 Or. 179, 539 P.2d 1054 (1975); Snyder v. Tompkins, Wash. App., 579
P.2d 994 (1978); Feisner v. Stinnett, 212 Kan. 26, 509 P.2d 1156 (1975);
15A Am. Jur. 2d Compromise and settlement Sections 5 and 25.
In this woefully long and disturbing case presently before the Court,
a settlement agreement was finally successfully negotiated and agreed to
by all parties.

The terms of the agreement were presented to and

approved by the Honorable Judge sa waya in his chambers.
were present and represented by counsel.

All parties

The terms of the agreement

were reduced to written form and submitted to opposing counsel for
approval of the form.

As set forth above, approval was received from all

parties as to the form with the exception of one small sub-paragraph which
dealt with a tangential issue not discussed at the pre-trial settlement
conference.
There was one condition f.>recedent that remained unaccomplished:
c·efendants Baum and Chatillion needed to provide financial information to
support their valuation of the lots.

Counsel for Plainti£fs Mascaro and
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Taylor acknowledged such a valuation in a letter dated ,Jcme 21, J 982 ,,,
described above. (R.556)

The condit.ion precedent having

""''°'''

satisficc

the terms of the agreement being qwte clear, the lower court order eu

1 hri,

the settlement agreement previously reached be enforced as set forth ui
Defendant-Respondent's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement. (See
Order and Judgment, dated November 5th, 198 2. R .5 79)

In so doing, all of

the issues of this protracted and unfortunate case were resolved except
for those issues related to Plaintiff-Appellant Mascaro's claims against
Defendant-Respondent.

All of the claims and issues involv:L-ig Plaintiff-

Appellant Taylor were resolved upon terms he had agreed to.

Plaintiff-

Appellant Mascaro received partial satisfaction of his claim against his
former partner,

Defendant- Respondent Joseph.
POINT V
A MOTION PURSUANT TO RULE 60(b) (7) MAY
BE CONSTRUED AS AN INDEPENDENT ACTION.

A Motion pursuant to Rule 60 ( b) ( 7) for fraud on the Court is based on
ancient principles of equity and rests in the Court's inherent equitable
powers. (see cases cited in Point I)

As such, in cases where none of the

parties would be prejudiced, many courts take the position that it makes no
difference whether the motion pursuant to Rule 60(b) (7) is construed as a
motion in the same case or as an independent action in equity.
Moores Federal Procedure, Section 60.38 [ 3] at 650 the rule
Where the adverse party is not preJudiced
an independent action for relief from a
federal judgment may be treated as a 60(b)
motion (citing Bros. Inc. v. W.E. Grace
Manufacturing Co., (5th Cir., 1963), 32f
.2d 594); and, conversely; a 60(b) motion
may be treated as the institution of an
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is

In

thus stated:

independent action.
(citing Hadden v.
Rumsey Products, (2nd Cir., 1952) 196 F.2d
92; Nixon v. Brewer, (MD Ala., 1970) 49
FRD 122.
ln the case of Selway v. Burns, 420 P.2d 640, the Montana Supreme
('r_,urt i11terpreted its rule 60(b) [which in pertinent part is identical to the
federal Rule 60(b) as is Utah Rule 60(b)] in the same way.

In a case that

was bought by way of a 60(b) motion by a non-party, that court upheld such
a procedure, and in so doing held:
Appellant's contention that Mrs. Suthard's
standing before the court depends upon Rule
60(b) and the joinder requirements of Rule
19 is too narrow.
It is not necessary for
purposes of this appeal to construe Rule 60(b)
to determine standing, because it has long been
the rule in Montana that a Court of equity
has inherent power, independent of statute,
to grant relief from judgments gained by fraud.
Bullard v. Zimmerman, 88 Mont. 271, 292 p.730.
The Bullard case, supra, has since been followed
many times by this Court. Most recently, in
Cure v. Southwick, 137 Mont. 1, 349 P.2d 575,
this Court added that the relief may be granted
either on motion in the original action or in a
separate equity suit.
Rule 60(b) expressly
preserved this inherent power in its last
sentence which provides: "This rule does not
limit the power of a court to entertain an
independent action to relieve a party from a
judgment, order, or proceeding, or to grant
relief to a defendant not personally notified
as may be provided by law, or to set aside a
judgment for fraud upon the court."
our federal courts also recognize and use the
historic equity power to set aside judgments
gained by fraud.
Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v.
Hartford Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 64 S.Ct.
997, 88 r., Ed. 1250. The only limitation
that has been placed upon the exercise of this
power is that the investigating court must
observe the usual safeguards of the adversary
process by granting notice to affected persons
and by conducting a fair hearing on the exist-Page 43-

ence of the fraud.
Universal Oil Co. v. Root
Refining Co., 328 u.s. 575, 66 s.ct. 1176, 9o
L.Ed. 1447 (emphasis added).
This Court has in the past adopted the position that where,, Jurlgmeri1
is attacked for fraud on the court under the provisions of Rule

?,() (

b) ( i

1

U.R.C.P., such a proceeding must be pursued in an independent action by
filing a separate suit, paying the statutory filing fee and requiring the
statutory issuance and service of process.
222,

341

P.2d 949

(1959).

Shaw v. Pilcher, 9 Utah 2d

Respondent-Defendant suggests that the

absolute requirement that the court may consider and resolve questions of
fraud upon the court only i f the form of the attack is an independent
action is not supported by a majority of the recent decisions dealing with
the problem, and is an elevation of form over substance. Based upon the
U.S.

Supreme

Court's

holding

in

Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford

Empire Co., supra, and the cogent arguments in Selway v. Burns, supra,
and Moores Federal Practice, supra, (and cases cited therein), Respondent-Defendant urges this Court to adopt the better reasoned rule, that as
long as the inherent safeguard of due process, including notice and
jurisdiction and opportunity to respond, are clearly met, the distinction
between a motion 60(b) for fraud on the court and an independent action
for the same is without significance.
It is not, however, necessary that that the Court adopt such a
position in the present case.

While

Respondent attacked the Default

Judgment in the original action by way of a motion pursuant to 60 (b) (7),
U.R.C.P., in view of the Shaw v. Pilcher line cf cases,
Defendant Joseph additionally

attacked

independent action brought in equity.

the

Respondent-

Default Judgment

Ul

ar'

That case is was brought in Third

-Page 44-

ll istrict Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and is entitled Charley

,J_oseph v. John

s.

Davis, et. al., Civil No. C-82- 3484.

A filing fee was

,,1<1 ,111d all named defendants, which includes all parties in the original
,._, 1ur1, were properly served with process of the court. By order of the

,-,,urt, dated November 5th, 1982, and signed by Judge Dee (R.587). the new
and independent suit in equity (Civil No. C-80-3484) was consolidated with
the original action (civil No. C-80-3305).

Respondent- Defendant Joseph

has thus complied with the requirements of this court as set forth in Shaw
and subsequent cases.

SUMMARY
The default judgment entered herein against Defendant-Respondent
Joseph, was entered as a result of attorney Davis' scheme to intentionally
and maliciously prevent Defendant- Respondent Joseph from responding to
the issues raised in the Plaintiff-Appellants' complaint.

Further, as a

result of his special knowledge as a lawyer, attorney Davis was able to
manipulate the judicial process in an attempt to prevent any post judgment
relief that may have been available to his client:

he failed to make a

timely motion to have the default set aside pursuant to Rule 60 (b) ( l) even
though he was well aware of the default; he intentionally lost a motion to
have the default set aside by failing to present a real argument in support
of the motion and presented no real defense against a motion to have the
default made final.
1id he

1

In both instances he resented no written briefs nor

make an earnest oral argument on these respective

motions.

'<ttorney Davis' motive in purposely working at his own client's defeat was
•o 1;revent the discovery of his embezzlement of partnership funds from his
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trust account by preventing litigation of the issues ra.ised l11 the Plal11tlffAppellants' complaint.

Defendant- Respondent Joseph, was thus denied

his right of access to the court to assert his defenses and countercla1rns
As a further result of Attorney Davis' fraud, a default Judqment

Wds

entered and made final even though it was unsupported by the pleadings,
and was clearly erroneous on its face.

Said default judgment consisted of

a money judgment in excess of $300,000.00, for unliquidated damages which
had never been proved, and which contained an obvious mathematical error
on its face.
Such a default judgment, obtained as the result of a massive fraud on
the court by an officer of the court, and which was defective on its face,
and was unsupported by the pleadings, was properly subject to being set
aside in its entirety by the court below, either by way of motion in the
original action or pursuant to an independent suit in equity.

Defendant-

Respondent Joseph brought a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b) (7), U.R.C.P.,
in the original action, and in addition, brought an independent suit in
equity attacking the default judgment as having been obtained through
fraud on the court pursuant to a scheme by an officer of the court to
defraud

and

pervert

the

judicial

process.

The

two

actions

were

consolidated.
Prior to the lower court ruling on the two consolidated attacks on the
default judgment, a settlement agreement was reached among the parties
to this appeal which discharged all of Defendant-Respondent Joseph's
liability to Plainti£f-Appellant Taylor, and satisfied the first $60,000.00
of any liability which might ultimately be enforced against DefendantRespondent

Joseph

and

in

favor

of
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Plaintiff-Appellant

Mascaro.

Plaintiff-Appellants attempted to repudiate the settlement agreement, but
rhe lower court found that a settlement had in fact been reached, and
,, l

<'r ced the same.

,q,,eement,
Juseph's

Subsequent to the enforcement of the settlement

the lower court held a

motion,

pursuant

to

Rule

hearing on Defendant-Respondent
60(b) (7),

as

consolidated

with

Defendant-Respondent Joseph's independent suit in equity, to set aside
the default judgment based on fraud on the court.

The court found that

the default judgment had been obtained as a direct result of attorney
Davis' scheme to defraud the court. However, rather than set aside the

entire default judgment, the court set aside so much of the judgment as had
not already been satisfied by the settlement agreement.

The court's

action in so doing was proper, and is supported by the facts of this case,
both as regards

Attorney

Davis'

embezzlement and subsequent clear

scheme to defraud the court, and the settlement agreement which was
reached.

The applicable law also clearly supports the court's action.

The court's order of February 8, 1983, modifying in part and setting aside
in part the previously entered default judgment, should be upheld in its

entirety.

However, in the event this Court determines that the lower

court's order is in some manner unsupportable, this Court should set aside
the default judgment altogether,

and allow a trial on the merits to

proceed.
Submitted this

of
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1983.

Joseph E. Tesch
Attorneys for DefendAnt
CHARLEY JOSEPH
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY
this 2,ft. day of
following:

mailed a copy of the foregoing Memorandum
Hundred and Eighty-Three, to the

Joseph c. Rust, Esq.
2000 Beneficial Life Tower
Salt Lake City, Utah
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